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Rumberger and Royce: Registration and Licensing of Union Organizers
NO TES
REGISTRATION AND LICENSING OF UNION ORGANIZERS
The expansion of American industry into previously unindustrialized areas has brought with it numerous problems generally
associated with the labor movement. One of the more pressing of
these problems is the attempt by states and political subdivisions
thereof to regulate or restrict the activities of labor union organizers.
The organizer is usually the first representative of the union to
present its ideals and objectives in a nonunion area. In initially
soliciting memberships and organizing a local the organizer faces a
difficult task. He must overcome a reluctance on the part of many
employees to identify themselves with the laboring class by joining
a union. Generally he must also surmount some resistance on the
part of the employer. The resulting opposition to union organization is often vigorous; violence is not unlikely. In order to prevent social turmoil and, in some instances, to hinder or prohibit
union organization, certain jurisdictions have enacted regulatory
measures affecting the organizer.
REGISTRATION LAWS

Registration is the simplest type of regulatory action that can
be utilized to control the union organizer. Registration statutes are
designed to inform the authorities and the public that an organizer
is at work in a particular locale by requiring him to register with
designated officials.' Secrecy is sometimes an important weapon for
the union struggling to gain a foothold in an unorganized area;
registration strips the veil of secrecy from the organizer. Registration
laws sometimes serve a useful public purpose, for knowledge of the
organizer's presence could prove extremely helpful to law enforcement agencies in fixing responsibility for any public disturbance
arising out of his activities. The same information, however, could
also become a valuable tool in the hands of the employer in counteracting union organization. In addition, awareness by a prospective
member that the union representative's identity is a matter of public
record might tend to inhibit his associating himself with the organizer
or the union.
The validity of registration statutes has been established. A Texas
'E.g., Marengo County, Ala., ch. 43L (1956); Anson County, N.C., ch. 1146L
(1957).
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statute requiring organizers to register with the secretary of state before soliciting memberships within the state2 has been held to be a
reasonable exercise of the police power. 3 A similar Kansas statute
which, in addition, called for the payment of a $2.00 fee 4 has been
upheld.

5

In Thomas v. Collins the Texas statute, as applied in that particular factual situation, was invalidated by the United States Supreme
Court. 6 Thomas, a nonresident union official, spoke to a group of

workers and in general terms entreated them to become union members. After concluding his address, he specifically solicited one individual for membership. The State of Texas attempted to prosecute
Thomas for failure to register with the secretary of state and to procure an organizer's card prior to the speech. The Texas Supreme Court
upheld the statute as a valid exercise of the state's police power and
"necessary for the protection of the general welfare of the public,
and particularly the laboring class." 7 The United States Supreme
Court agreed that "the State has power to regulate labor unions,"8
but nevertheless reversed the state court's decision on the ground
that the regulation attempted to "trespass upon the domains set
apart for free speech and free assembly." 9 The Court indicated that
the result might have been different had the speaker engaged in conduct going beyond the right of free discussion, apparently neglecting
the fact that Thomas did exactly that when he solicited an individual
for membership. Aside from this specific case, the point remains
that regulatory measures requiring the registration of union organizers
are valid and will be upheld.
LICENSING LAWS

A more common but considerably more complex type of regulatory legislation is the licensing statute. These statutes usually require
the applicant to pay a fee and meet other qualifications in order to
obtain a license enabling him to engage in union activities.
2
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5154a, §5 (1948).
3AFL v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
4KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §44-806 (1949).
5Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51
690 (1945).
6323 U.S. 516 (1945).

(D. Kan.), appeal dismissed, 326 U.S.

?Ex parte Thomas, 141 Tex. 591, 596, 174 S.W.2d 958, 961 (1943).
8323 U.S. at 532.

91bid.
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NOTES
Fees
The fees required by various state statutes and municipal ordinances have ranged from $1.0010 to $5,000.11 It is well settled that
an organizer can be required to pay a reasonable fee for the privilege
of exercising his vocation," and when the fee is imposed only for
the purpose of covering the administrative costs of licensing it will
generally be upheld as reasonable.
Excessive fees will be invalidated if "on their face they are a restriction of the free exercise of those freedoms which are protected
by the first amendment."'13 A Georgia municipal ordinance requiring
a fee of $5,000 was labeled as excessive on its face and held to be unconstitutional. 4 Another municipal ordinance, which provided for
an initial fee of $2,000 plus $500 for each member obtained, was invalidated.' 5 A third Georgia municipality repealed an ordinance requiring payment of $1,000 plus 100 for each twenty-four-hour period
during which an organizer recruited.16 The obvious purpose of requiring these fees was not to regulate licensing or raise revenue but
to prevent the unionization of workers.
A fee that is not excessive is permissible, but when the fee goes
beyond the pale of reasonableness it is subject to nullification. Reasonableness is, of course, a matter of degree, but a fee that is excessive on its face will be invalidated.
CharacterRequirements
Many licensing statutes prescribe certain personal qualifications
which the applicant must meet in order to obtain a license. Among
other things these statutes usually require good moral character' and
10KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §44-804 (1949).
6
"'See Starnes v. City of Milledgeville, 8 CCH LAB. CAS. ff 2,340 (1944).
Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan.), appeal dismissed, 326
U.S. 690 (1945).
"3Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114 (1943).
'4Starnes v. City of Milledgeville, 8 CCH LAB. CAS. f62,340 (1944).
'5An ordinance of the City of Baxley, Ga., was declared unconstitutional because the city officials had an uncontrolled discretion as to whether to issue the

'2E.g.,

license. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
loAn ordinance of the City of Carrollton, Ga., with this provision was repealed
after an indication by a federal court of its unconstitutionality. Denton v. City of
Carrollton, 235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1956).
",E.g., FLA. STAT. §447.04 (1957).
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the absence of any prior felony conviction.'8 An interesting example
of the stringent conditions that must sometimes be met in establishing these qualifications can be found in South Carolina, where the
prospective organizer is required to furnish three character witnesses. 9
Ostensibly the purpose of character requirements is to protect
the public from those who would fraudulently solicit dues. Actually,
however, it is unusual for the organizer to collect dues from newly
acquired members; ordinarily dues are not collected until some
bargaining agreement has been reached. A more justifiable purpose
of these requirements would seem to be to minimize the possibility
of violence and general community disorder.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the validity of
licensing laws containing character tests when the activity to be
licensed was of a fiduciary nature. 0 This would seem to be inapplicable to union organizers. In AFL v. Mann,2 2 however, the
Texas statute 22 prohibiting any person convicted of a felony whose
civil rights have not been restored from serving as an officer, official,
or organizer of a labor union was upheld. The court stated that this
provision in no sense denied any person the right to work and earn
a livelihood but merely prohibited him from occupying a responsible
position in an organization affecting the public interest economically
and politically.
Aliens and Nonresidents
Several licensing statutes deny organizers' licenses to aliens;23
others require the applicant to be a resident of the locality in which
he intends to operate.24 The validity of these restrictions is questionable. It has been held that a state may not deny aliens the right
to engage in any private trade or calling on terms of equality with
'sE.g., FLA. STAT. §447.04 (1957); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5154a, §4a (1947).

19Acts and Joint Resolutions of S.C. 948 (1956). Similar measures were enacted
in eight other counties. Id., Acts 442, 365, 328, 233, 172, 333, 406, 329 (1957).
20Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917) (security dealers).

21188 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
22TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5154a, §4a (1947).
23E.g., FLA. STAT. §447.04 (1957); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 5154a, §4a (1947).
24A city ordinance of Milledgeville, Ga., requiring among other things that
applicants for organizers' licenses must have resided within the city limits for at
least one year was declared unconstitutional because it denied equal protection
of the laws to nonresidents. Starnes v. City of Milledgeville, 8 CCH LAB. CAS.

jJ62,340 (1944).
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citizens, except when the state, under its police power, may absolutely or conditionally prohibit the calling through the exaction of
a license. 25 The fact of alienage may justify denial of the license
privilege to an organizer, provided there is some relation between
2
exclusion of the alien and protection of the public welfare. 6
Licensing Boards
A number of jurisdictions vest special boards with the power to
arbitrarily deny or grant a petition for a license27 An extreme example of this type of provision can be found in the Barnwell County,
South Carolina, ordinance which provides that the board "shall have
power to refuse to issue any permit for any just reason and for the
peace and good order of the citizens of Barnwell County." 28 This
ordinance is as yet untested; however, similar provisions in other
statutes, both state and local, have been declared invalid2 9 The
vesting of uncontrolled discretion in designated officials, thereby
enabling them to contravene peaceful enjoyment of basic constitutional guaranties, is "an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms." 0
FLORIDA LAW

Florida has been one of the forerunners in the attempt to regulate
and restrict labor unions and union officials. 31 One Florida statute requires all union "business agents" to register with the secretary of
state and to procure from a board comprised of the governor, the
secretary of state, and the superintendent of education a license permitting an individual to act in this capacity. In Hill v. State ex rel.
Watson 32 the Florida Supreme Court stated that the mere requirement of registration and the procurement of a license were valid
exercises of the state police power. The Court noted, however, that
25People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, aff'd, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
261bid.
27E.g., Ordinances of Milledgeville, Ga., Barnwell County, S. C., Kershaw
County, S. C.

2 Acts and Joint Resolutions of S.C. 948, §4 (1956).
29Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); Starnes v. City of Milledgeville, 8 CCH LAB. CAS. 1t62,340 (1944).
3Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1957).
3iFLA. STAT.

§447.04 (1957).

32155 Fla. 245, 19 So.2d 857 (1944).
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certain portions of the act that gave to the Board an excessive amount
of arbitrary power in determining what constituted the public interest were invalid and should be deleted.
In reversing this decision, 33 the United States Supreme Court held
the statute completely invalid as interfering with the "full freedom"
given to employees to choose their own collective bargaining representatives and officials under the National Labor Relations Act. 34 In

so holding, the Court stated that in enacting the National Labor
Relations Act Congress did not attach any conditions whatsoever to
the "full freedom" of choice concept and that to allow this statute
to stand unchanged would be to substitute "Florida's judgment for
the workers' judgment." 35 Prior to this decision, the National Labor
Relations Board had held that an employer must negotiate with a
union agent regardless of whether he had received a license under
this statute. 36 Accordingly, in the Hill case the State of Florida
argued that since the union's representative could engage in collective bargaining without securing a license, the statute did not, in
fact, interfere with any rights granted to employees by the National
Labor Relations Act. In rejecting this argument the Court indicated
that by sustaining the statute the employees, through their selected
representatives, would be susceptible to fine or imprisonment.
There was also a jurisdictional dispute involved in the Hill case.
The National Labor Relations Act failed to include provisions requiring the licensing of union agents, registration of unions, or the
filing of financial reports. Nevertheless, the Court held that the
National Labor Relations Board had pre-empted the field, and thus
the state was precluded from passing any restrictive legislation affecting the choice of representatives by union members.
In the Hill case the Court was concerned primarily with a determination of whether the Florida statute was invalid as applied
to business agents of the union. Seemingly the term business agents,
as defined by Florida law, 37 would include both bargaining representatives and union organizers. In a 1946 opinion, however, the
33Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).

34National Labor Relations Act §1, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§151 (1958): "It is declared to be the policy of the United States . . . [to protect]
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing.
35325 U.S. at 541.
36Eppinger & Russell Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1259 (1944).
3

7FLA.

STAT.

§447.02 (2) (1957).
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Attorney General of Florida recognized the Court's decision only in
so far as it pertained to the removal of statutory restrictions imposed
on bargaining representatives. 38 As applied to other officials of the
union, particularly the organizer, the opinion indicated that the
statute was still in effect.
In 1951 the Florida legislature deleted from the statute that part
which had been declared objectionable by the Florida Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court. The excised clause conferred
upon the designated state board arbitrary power to determine whether
a license should be issued. 39 The statute presently remains in effect
as amended in 1951.
Aside from the Hill case, there is at least one other indication that
the judiciary in Florida will view regulatory or licensing statutes or
ordinances critically. In Pittman v. Nix the Florida Supreme Court
invalidated a municipal ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of
union members within the municipality.40 The Court held that the
ordinance violated the constitutional guaranties of life, liberty, due
process of law, freedom of speech and press, and the right of acquisition, possession, and protection of property.
CONCLUSION

The union organizer is essential to the continued existence and
expansion of the labor movement. 41 Theoretically, however, the
states can regulate unions and union officials in the same manner
that they can regulate other areas of human endeavor. 42 Most juris-

dictions having registration and licensing laws maintain that the
validity of these laws rests upon a reasonable exercise of the police
power.

43

Simple registration laws are valid unless they infringe basic constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.
The validity of licensing laws is not so dearly established. Seemingly
3sOps. ATT'Y GEN. FLA. 602 (1946).
39FLA. STAT. §447.04 (1951).

40152 Fla. 378, 11 So.2d 791 (1943).
4
'Pittman v. Nix, 152 Fla. 378, 11 So.2d 791 (1943).
42E.g., Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916) (upholding the right of the state
to license private employment agencies); Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128 (1911)
(private bankers); Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296 (1895) (peddlers).
43E.g., Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). Ex parte Thomas,
141 Tex. 591, 174 S.W.2d 958 (1943).
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the imposition of a reasonable fee would not invalidate a licensing
statute. The levying of excessive fees, however, places a premium
on the enjoyment of constitutional guaranties and is clearly unconstitutional. Likewise, making the issuance of a license dependent
upon the arbitrary will of governmental officials, either by a grant
to them of unlimited discretion or allowing them to misuse the
various character tests, would be held to be in conflict with either the
Constitution or the federal labor acts, or both. The character tests in
the present Florida law would probably be sustained only in so far
as they purport to exclude from the occupation people with alleged
moral deficiencies. Should an attempt be made to use them as a
weapon against union organizational efforts they would probably be
invalidated.
In view of the Supreme Court's recognition of the social and
economic value of labor unions 44 and the congressional policy of encouraging and fostering the labor movement, it is doubtful that any
law that in effect restricts or prohibits efforts on the part of unions
to expand and obtain new members would be upheld.
RAYMOND

E.

W.

ROYCE

THOM RUMBERGER

44See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937); American
Steel Foundaries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921).
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